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Access Orders and the ‘New’ New Institutional Economics of Development 
 
Hazel Gray 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the Access Order theories of development that have 
emerged as the latest reformulation of New Institutional Economics by Douglass 
North and his associates. These scholars claim that Access Order theory 
represents a radical break from previous models of institutional change in 
developing countries. They argue that at the heart of development is the problem 
of controlling organized violence. Two distinct social orders, the Limited Access 
Order and the Open Access Order, have emerged as solutions to the problem of 
endemic violence. This article traces the evolution of these new ideas within 
North’s institutional theory and examines how violence is treated within the new 
framework. The article evaluates the underlying economic model on which the 
theory is based and argues that the conceptual device of the Open Access Order 
preserves key features of the neoclassical approach within North’s work. The 
article contrasts the Access Order approach with the political settlements 
framework. To conclude, the article argues that the Access Order approach serves 
to strip the progressive potential out of development by ignoring how controlling 
violence may affect human capabilities, rights and freedom. 
 
 ----------------------------- 
[first unnumbered footnote] 
 
This paper was first presented in a panel at the Fourth Annual Conference of the International 
Initiative to Promote Political Economy (IIPPE) at the International Institute for Social Studies, The 
Hague, The Netherlands (11 July 2013). I would like to thank the audience and the organizers of the 
conference for their comments and support. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for 
their comments on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimers apply. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For more than two decades, good governance has been the dominant theme in the discourse 
on politics and economic performance in developing countries for international development 
institutions and large parts of academia. Although sections of academia have always been 
sceptical of the good governance agenda and its theoretical underpinnings in new institutional 
economics, its hegemonic position is now also increasingly questioned by the mainstream. 
The search for new theoretical directions on governance pre-dates the recent re-examination 
of received economic wisdom triggered by the global financial crisis (Hodgson, 2009). 
Rather, its roots lie in a slow build-up of evidence and experiences that have challenged the 
axioms of good governance in a number of ways. The growing critique has focused on the 
problems of measuring institutions and institutional quality, the validity of econometric data 
on governance, the (im)possibility of importing institutions from the West, particularly in the 
light of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the rise of alternative models of governance 
and good economic performance from Asia (Glaeser et al., 2004; Gray, 2007; Khan, 2004; 
Knack, 2002; Rodrik, 2008).    
 
The challenges of these ‘anomalies’, in Kuhnian terms, have generated a number of 
responses, most of which focus on the pace and form of institutional change while sustaining 
important underlying aspects of the good governance paradigm (see Kuhn, 1962). Dani 
Rodrik’s influential work (2008) provides a good measure of the parameters of the 
mainstream in this regard. He argues that there is a distinction between the function and form 
of institutions, thus maintaining the view that the main elements of good governance — 
secure generalized property rights and accountable transparent political systems — are the 
critical ingredients for improved economic performance in developing countries, while taking 
on various forms depending on the specific context (Rodrik, 2004). A similar approach is 
found in the ‘good enough’ governance agenda (Grindle, 2004, 2007) that calls for a staged 
implementation of good governance reforms recognizing the unique characteristics of state 
capacities and political constraints. Over time, these criticisms have filtered through to the 
policy sphere, as is evident, for example, in a number of World Development Reports (World 
Bank, 2005, 2011) that have distanced themselves from some of the earlier claims of the 
good governance agenda typified by the 2002 World Development Report entitled Building 
Institutions for Markets.    
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Within these competing claims to theoretical innovation, the recent work of Douglass North 
on violence and social order merits particular examination. The corpus of North’s co-
authored work on this topic, which is made up of two books and numerous working papers 
and articles (North et al., 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2013a, 2013b),
1
 aims ‘to provide a new 
framework for interpreting the course of human history over the past ten thousand years, and 
to open new ways of thinking about the pressing problems of political and economic 
development facing the world today’ (North et al., 2009: xiii). In this article, I refer to this 
body of work by North et al. as a theory of Access Orders. Their main critique of the 
prevailing thinking on governance starts from the observation that institutions work in 
strikingly different ways in developing and developed countries. This observation, they 
argue, is shared by a number of contemporary social scientists, including those most 
associated with the mainstream cannon on development and institutions — for example, 
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Paul Collier and William Easterly (North et al., 
2013b: 2). However, they argue that the distinctiveness of their approach is in providing a 
systematic explanation for these differences by placing the problem of organized violence at 
the heart of development.  
 
According to their theory, two fundamentally different types of social order exist in the 
contemporary world which control violence in unique ways: the Limited Access Order, 
encompassing all contemporary developing countries and past societies with settled 
agriculture, and the Open Access Order, that is found only in the handful of rich countries 
that are members of the OECD. In Limited Access Orders violence is controlled by limiting 
access to economic and political organizations and thus creating rents. These rents are then 
distributed to powerful groups to incentivize their peaceful cooperation within the existing 
order. In contrast, a virtuous cycle in Open Access Orders ensures that competition, open 
access to organizations and the generalized rule of law minimizes violence, promotes stability 
and generates economic growth. Thus, they propose that ‘development tools based on first 
world experiences are ill-suited to the development goals in third world countries’ (North et 
al., 2007: 1). Development policy, therefore, needs to focus on how the state can solidify 
                                                          
1
 The new framework was initially set out by Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast 
in a joint paper (2006) and in the book Violence and Social Orders (2009 and 2013a). Stephen Webb 
has also been associated with the development of these theories and was a co-editor of In the Shadow 
of Violence (2013b), a collection of essays that applies the Access Order theories to a set of countries. 
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itself and maintain or strengthen its control over violence and, subsequently, on how to 
support a legal framework for non-state organizations to exist and proliferate in order to 
eventually develop into an Open Access Order.    
 
The importance of critically engaging with the newest of North’s new institutional theories is 
threefold. First, North is widely recognized as the key intellectual figure within new 
institutional economics and his earlier work was arguably the most important contribution to 
the theoretical framework of the good governance agenda.
2
 The Access Order theories are 
presented as breaking with a number of his long-held theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, 
these new theories also appear to reassert important features of his underlying analytical 
framework which is rooted in neoclassical economics. The claim that these theories are new, 
therefore, needs to be critically evaluated. Second, North’s work is generally characterized as 
a theory of history, but the Access Order theories are explicitly presented as a theory of 
contemporary development with important implications for development policy. The Access 
Order theories have already found themselves in wide circulation in academia and in policy 
discussion. This is evident, for example, from the 2011 World Development Report that 
draws heavily on the Access Order framework. As yet, however, very little analysis of the 
implications of these new theories for development policy has been undertaken. The article 
contributes to this end by examining the extent to which the Access Order theories sustain or 
challenge core elements of the existing good governance paradigm. Third, although North 
and his associates present their ideas as a distinctively new theory of social and economic 
change, the article examines the extent to which the emergence and content of these theories 
also reflects changes within the broader framing of international development over the past 
decade, in particular the rise of the idea of development-as-security.  
 
This article proceeds through five sections, the first of which explains the main theoretical 
logic of the Access Order theory of development. The second section sets out the trajectory of 
North’s intellectual journey. It traces the development of the concepts within the Access 
Order framework from his earlier work arguing that, while he has modified many of his 
                                                          
2
 Governance is a broad term that draws on a number of different schools of thought but the influence 
of new institutional economics is particularly important within the donor policy-oriented engagement 
with the concept, in which governance is understood as primarily concerning the state structures that 
support accountability. As Doornbos (2001) points out, there has been a much wider engagement with 
the concept of governance in academic approaches that are not restricted to the theoretical framework 
of new institutional economics. 
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initial neoclassical assumptions, his understanding of society is still attached to an underlying 
set of assumptions about rationality, optimization and the primacy of the free market. In the 
third section I examine the characterization of violence by North and his associates as the key 
problem of development and situate their approach within other theoretical approaches to 
violence and development. The article then turns to the economic theory embedded in the 
model and sets out the limitations of the approach to understanding economic transformation 
and the relationship between violence and economic change. I argue that North et al.’s 
division of the world into Limited and Open Access systems allows them to preserve the 
primacy of competitive rent-free markets as the counterfactual against which the real world 
should be judged. Finally the article contrasts the Access Order approach with the political 
settlements theory of development. To conclude, I argue that the Access Order theories 
present an important challenge to the existing dominant paradigm of good governance. 
However, while North et al. identify the right concepts to place at the heart of the study of 
development — conflict, power, organization, institutions, economic change and ideas — 
these can only be partially understood within the a-historical logic of individual maximization 
on which their framework rests.  
 
 
THE LOGIC OF ACCESS ORDERS  
 
North et al. argue that their new work on Access Orders presents a radical departure from 
previous theories that explain the relationship between politics, economics and development. 
Their claim to originality rests on their understanding of the role of violence and their 
rejection of the Weberian idea that the most important characteristic of modern states, in 
which political order prevails over civil war, is a collective agreement that the state alone 
holds the legitimate control over violence. In contrast, the theoretical starting point for the 
Access Order theory of development is the assertion that no single organization, institution or 
individual ever holds a monopoly on violence; instead, the capacity for violence between 
different groups is an inevitable feature of both ordered and disordered societies. The solution 
to the problem of the inherent and diffuse capacity for violence within all human societies, 
they argue, is to be found in the structure of institutions and the material incentives that 
institutions create. Thus, at the heart of their new approach is the argument that for humans to 
live in viable social groups, institutions that create constraints and incentive mechanisms to 
control the inherent potential for violence between members of the group are needed.   
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The ability of individuals ‘to control the violence of others depends on the structure and 
maintenance of relationships amongst powerful individuals’ (North et al., 2009: 18). What 
they mean by relationships is the institutionalized mechanisms through which people can 
bargain over material rewards and punishments. The powerful individuals of Access Orders 
belong to elites which become the principal political actors because of their advantages in 
leadership, whether material or other, that allow them to mobilize group violence to achieve 
their own material objectives. Despite their claims to theoretical originality, their 
understanding of development draws heavily on the widely used neo-patrimonial approach to 
politics in developing countries,
3
 which argues that elites maintain control over their clients 
through personal ties. Thus, the power of any organization in a developing country depends 
on the personal identity of the organization’s leadership and the ability of elites to distribute 
material rewards to their clients in return for support. The reason why elites wish to control 
the violence of other elites, according to this theory, is that violence creates uncertainty and 
destroys production; hence, there is a trade-off between the level of violence and the rate of 
economic development. Elites wish to maximize their returns but they can only do this if they 
can successfully constrain the potential violence of other elites. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) also characterize politics as being a process of elite bargaining but in their approach 
elites are driven by their desire to maximize profits alone, not under the threat of potential 
violence by other elites (See North et al 2013a; 274).  
 
In Violence and Social Orders, North et al. (2009: 1) define a social order as ‘the way 
societies craft institutions that support the existence of specific forms of human organization, 
the way societies limit or open access to those organizations, and through the incentives 
created by the pattern of organization’. They argue that over the entirety of human history 
there have been three different social orders that have emerged, each with distinct 
mechanisms for controlling violence: the Foraging Order, the Limited Access Order and the 
Open Access Order. In the Foraging Order, consisting of ‘small social groups characteristic 
of hunter-gatherer societies’ (ibid.: 2), levels of violence were very high and were only 
controlled through repeated personal contacts within small groups. In societies based on 
                                                          
3
 Building on Weber’s ideal types, the neo-patrimonial approach as exemplified in the work of Bates 
(1983), Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Kang (2003) argues that politics operates through patron–client 
relations rather than the legal and formal structure of the state because of underlying socio-cultural 
features of developing countries.  
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larger groups such personal connections are no longer viable and two distinct patterns of 
social institution — rules and organizations supported by distinct belief systems — developed 
over time to control violence. The Limited Access Order and the Open Access Order both 
generate lower levels of violence than the Foraging Order. However, the role formal and 
informal institutions play in constraining violence varies in fundamental ways between the 
two orders due to different underlying incentives systems created by the structure of 
competition between elites.    
 
In Limited Access Orders, violence is contained by setting limits on rights to form 
organizations. Organizations, according to North’s long-standing definition, include firms, 
political parties, trade unions, religious congregations and universities, where individuals are 
bound together by a common purpose. Restricting access to the establishment of 
organizations generates rents for those who have the right to be part of an organization. The 
rights to these augmented income flows are then distributed to powerful individuals to 
incentivize cooperation between different elites. When elites are able to reach an agreement 
about how rents should be distributed, they are able to form a ruling coalition that can 
dominate the formal institutions of the state and maintain control over the distribution of 
rights to rents. If the flow of incomes generated by control of rents is not in line with the 
violence capacity of different elites, powerful factions of the ruling elite will resort to 
violence until their demands for a redistribution of rights within the ruling coalition are met. 
A successful distribution of rents between elites that generates stability does not depend on 
the extent to which the distribution of rents is aligned with formal rules but on the extent to 
which the distribution of rents matches the relative strength (the capacity for violence) of 
different groups controlled by the elites concerned. This means that politics in the Limited 
Access Order is often unstable and individuals and organizations cannot credibly commit to 
observing formal rules. Nor is the pursuance of reforms that enforce more transparent 
systems of resource allocation within the state necessarily the best option for preserving 
stability within a ruling coalition. 
 
Nevertheless, even where formal rules are not observed, political stability can be achieved 
which can facilitate economic growth and development. Development progresses within the 
Limited Access Order as countries move from being a ‘fragile LAO’ with high levels of 
violence, to becoming what the authors define as a ‘basic LAO’, where government is fairly 
well established and violence is often latent and managed. In the final stage, a ‘mature LAO’ 
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achieves less violence and more diverse and longer lasting organizations. These organizations 
start to have a vested interest in maintaining impersonal rules governing the relations between 
elites, establishing the foundation of the Open Access system. The direction and pace of this 
process is determined by the changes in the relative balance of power within the ruling 
coalition.  
    
Transition from a Limited to an Open Access system involves attaining a set of ‘doorstep 
conditions’. These are the rule of law for elites, perpetually lived organizations in the public 
and private spheres, and consolidated control over the military. However, even with these 
conditions in place, the shift to a self-sustaining Open Access system is not guaranteed. North 
et al. (2013b: 349) argue that ‘open access is not just around the corner, and modern 
democracy and economic development are not likely outcomes of a revolutionary struggle’. 
The transition between the two orders depends on a tipping point being reached in the 
number of independent organizations that have an interest in maintaining impersonal rules 
that restrict violence.  
 
In Open Access Orders, violence is minimized by a completely different institutionalized 
incentive mechanism. Rather than elites benefitting from the creation of rents, in Open 
Access Orders elites maximize their own self-interest by adherence to formal impersonal 
rules that set limits on organized violence and centralize the legal use of violence within the 
state. The Open Access Order relies on competition, open access to organizations and the rule 
of law to hold society together and to limit violence. This system depends on the emergence 
of a critical number of organizations that have an interest in maintaining impersonal relations; 
but, once in place, the Open Access Order generates a self-enforcing mechanism that ensures 
adherence to social norms and formal rules that limit violence and encourage competition. 
According to North et al., Open Access Orders are, therefore, more peaceful and also 
generate higher and more stable economic growth through economic competition.  
 
While, ultimately, the emergence of an Open Access system provides a lasting solution to the 
problem of violence, very few contemporary countries are on the threshold of this transition. 
Instead, North et al. argue that the most important problem within contemporary development 
is how to reduce violence within the political logic of the Limited Access Order. The standard 
governance reform agenda in developing countries that has focused on strengthening the rule 
of law, liberalizing markets and improving accountability and transparency within the state 
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cannot achieve these ends, according to North et al. Rather, governance reform in developing 
countries needs to focus on how to support stable elite pacts. This would involve the 
acceptance of different types of formal and informal mechanisms that distribute rents to 
powerful elites. By generating stability, higher levels of investment will ensue and lead to an 
eventual transition to the Open Access system with higher rates of competition and lower 
levels of violence. North et al. argue that the implications of the Access Order theory of 
development are profound. They suggest that the commitment to enhancing the formal 
mechanisms of governance in developing countries through the ‘good governance’ approach 
of strengthening the rule of law, improving democratic accountability and liberalizing 
markets has been fundamentally mistaken. Rather, development partners need to focus on the 
political implications of these reforms for the stability of the ruling coalition and the eventual 
emergence of enough organizations to create a new equilibrium that can sustain an Open 
Access Order.  
 
 
NORTH’S INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY   
 
The main theoretical content of Douglass North’s newest work on institutions is, on first 
assessment, both familiar and surprising. North argues that his latest work breaks from his 
existing opus in important ways. Nevertheless, the motivations and underlying questions that 
are addressed in Violence and Social Orders are very much consistent with his long-term 
interests. These have been in explaining divergent economic performance across time and in 
the desire to improve and enrich the basic neoclassical model that he used in his early work to 
explain historical change with insights from a range of other disciplinary approaches. His 
expanding intellectual ambitions are reflected in the growing scope of his analysis — from a 
study of economic growth in the United States over a 70-year period (North, 1961), through 
explaining the rise of the western world (North, 1990) and finally to the formidable task of 
providing ‘A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history’ (the subtitle of 
North et al., 2009).   
 
As the historical scope of North’s work has grown, his core theoretical concepts have also 
expanded beyond the initial confines of the neoclassical model, where changing economic 
performance was explained as a process of individuals responding to relative price changes. 
His early and most important theoretical innovation was, of course, the inclusion of 
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transaction costs to explain the existence and persistence of institutions. North argues that the 
inclusion of transaction costs within his theoretical framework represents a break with his 
previous commitment to the neoclassical model. Nevertheless, a set of assumptions around 
methodological individualism, methodological optimization
4
 and the primacy of liberalized 
markets that derive from neoclassical principles have remained core to North’s understanding 
of society and the economy.  
 
North’s early inclusion of transaction costs within his framework produced a set of 
functionalist models of historical change; in North and Thomas (1973), for example, 
economic development occurs as individuals respond to changes in relative prices and engage 
in a voluntary bargaining process over institutional change to lower transaction costs. These 
models are functionalist in the sense that they explain institutional change as being the result 
of beneficial outcomes from the institutional changes themselves; institutional change will 
only occur if it is value enhancing. This is because self-interested individuals will only 
engage in voluntary bargaining to change institutions if the gainers can compensate losers at 
an agreed price that leaves them both better off. The path of institutional change will be, by 
definition, Pareto enhancing because only institutions that result in Pareto improvements can 
emerge.  
 
North’s later models (1987, 1990, 1995) provide a richer account of political processes by 
bringing in the concept of the polity, organizations and belief systems to address issues of 
collective action that he recognized as lacking within his earlier assumptions about the 
behavioural mechanisms that drive institutional change. His early work on the polity starts 
with the assumption that the state can be modelled as an individual ruler whose aim is to 
maximize its returns. North (1987) argues that the political process can be likened to a 
political market in which political transaction costs can hinder the emergence of more 
efficient institutional arrangements. In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (1990), he no longer presents the extractive state as the main agent of economic 
change. Instead, a central role is given to organizations that he defines as groups of 
individuals bound together by a common purpose. Organizations, therefore, become actors 
that behave like individuals and aim to maximize their benefits within the broader 
                                                          
4
 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that in Understanding the Process of 
Economic Change, North (2005) acknowledges the importance of non-ergodicity and Knight-Keynes 
uncertainty, the presence of which makes optimization difficult to operationalize.  
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institutional framework.
5
  In the process of furthering their own objectives within the given 
institutional framework, organizations cause incremental institutional change which in turn 
shapes the path of economic development. Again, however, actual institutional change is a 
function of the level of political and economic transaction costs. In turn, the level of 
transaction cost depends on the types of institutional structure within which organizations 
operate. North remained committed to the idea that low transaction cost institutions are ones 
that facilitate political and economic exchange through Western-style democracy and 
liberalized market systems. Questions of power were unimportant within this approach as all 
institutional changes involve voluntary agreement on the price of compensation for losses 
incurred as institutions are modified, and the full payment to the losers once institutions are 
changed.  
 
The problem with all of these earlier models is that they could not adequately explain why the 
introduction of low transaction cost institutions in developing countries through governance 
reforms, democratization and market liberalization produced such variable economic results. 
Beyond formal institutions, North had always argued that informal institutions such as social 
conventions, norms and beliefs were also important in explaining economic change. From the 
1990s, North increasingly argued that ideology and belief systems were more important in 
explaining divergent economic performance than formal institutions. The recognition of 
ideology opens up an opportunity for new institutional approaches to adopt a more rounded 
conception of human motivations. North remained committed to the idea that humans are 
acquisitive and constantly seek to maximize their utility; however, he no longer assumed that 
utilities were determined by fixed preference functions. Ideological commitments were 
recognized as creating distinct subjectivities that shaped human motivations. Nevertheless, 
while recognizing a plurality of human motivations, North maintains a commitment to the 
idea of rational optimization, albeit bounded within particular ideological parameters. 
 
The reason for this is that he uses the concept of ideology primarily as a form of 
informational constraint that affects the costs of transacting. For example, Denzau and North 
(1994) argue that certain forms of belief serve to lower transaction costs, while other belief 
                                                          
5
 Hodgson (2006) argues that North was wrong to distinguish between organizations and institutions. 
Rather than playing the role of actors within an institutional framework, organizations depend on 
internal institutional rules and mechanisms to ensure compliance of members through coercion and 
persuasion. Organizations should therefore be considered as a specific type of institution rather than 
as a separate conceptual entity. 
12 
 
systems make social interactions more costly and thus constrain economic development. 
Thus, they argue that poor economic performance and high levels of poverty are a result of 
the dominant belief systems prevalent in a country. North remains committed to the idea that, 
over time, incremental change to lower transaction costs will emerge as ‘individuals alter 
their ideological perspectives when their experiences are inconsistent with their ideology’ 
(1981: 49). However, he does not seek to explain how, or why, certain ideologies and belief 
systems emerge in the first place. As Rutherford (1994) argues, North leaves ideology as 
exogenous to his model of historical change. He does not seek to provide an historical context 
to the emergence of particular ideas. In his work from this period, North also begins to 
discuss the role of violence in economic development as he attempts to deal with a more 
complex social reality than could be captured in the simple neoclassical model of his early 
days. At this stage in his work, however, the prevalence of violence in certain societies is 
explained as an outcome of particular belief systems and is thus treated as an exogenous 
constraint on economic performance. 
 
A striking feature of North’s theories of economic development, and one of the most 
important reasons for the enormous appeal of his work across the social sciences, was that he 
presented his conceptual building blocks — institutions, organizations, beliefs — as universal 
categories (Milonakis and Fine, 2007), not delimited by time or space. The universal benefit 
of these institutions to economic development was, of course, the theoretical bedrock of the 
good governance agenda. The Access Order theories conspicuously reject this previous 
commitment by arguing that the implications of particular institutional forms for economic 
development cannot be generalized but depend on the underlying social order. The idea of 
social order, originating in the work of Hobbes, has been central to political economy but, as 
a means of understanding economic performance in developing countries, it is perhaps most 
associated with the work of Samuel Huntingdon whose book Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968) made the ethically dubious justification for authoritarian rule in developing 
countries.  
 
In more recent years, a number of influential theorists such as Bates (2001) and Fukuyama 
(2012) have returned to framing economic development around the concept of social order. 
Building on Olson (1993), Bates argues that order is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for long-run economic growth and social transformation. North’s joint work on order in the 
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early 2000s
6
 was similar to Bates’s in that they were both primarily concerned with the 
conditions under which order prevails over disorder rather than with how distinct social 
orders may affect patterns of economic development. North did, however, argue that stable 
orders can be either authoritarian or consensual but he did not, at this stage, articulate the 
difference between these systems as unique social orders under which institutions, 
organizations and beliefs operate in distinct ways to limit collective violence.
7
  
 
The concept of social orders as representing unique and distinct types of societies only comes 
to the fore within North’s work after 2005. The difference after 2005 is that North assumes 
that the common analytical categories which have been the hallmark of his previous work on 
economic development — institutions, organizations and beliefs — have different economic 
and political implications in the three social orders that he argues cover the entirety of human 
history. While this may initially appear to be a break from the a-historical nature of his 
conceptual framework, the three orders do not refer to historically delimited periods of time. 
For example, the Limited Access Order includes the Aztec Empire as well as contemporary 
developing countries from Somalia to Brazil. Instead, each Order represents a unique 
incentive system with an internal logic that determines the impact of institutions, 
organizations and beliefs on socioeconomic change. North is certainly not arguing that these 
concepts can only be properly understood within specific historical contexts. Despite his 
expanding conceptual lexicon, his work exhibits consistency in terms of its most important 
features. Over time, North’s work has continued to explore complex social phenomenon but 
within an a-historical model in which social change is driven by individual optimizing 
strategies and the pursuit of self-interest.  
 
 
VIOLENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
                                                          
6
 North’s engagement with the concept of order can be traced to a joint article (North et al., 2000) and 
a subsequent chapter entitled ‘The Sources of Order and Disorder’ in North (2005). From 2007, 
however, North and his associates distinguish between order and social order as two distinct concepts.  
7
 Instead North argues that these two systems are distinguished by the extent to which decision 
makers are influenced by the formal and particularly the informal constraints of the system. Disorder 
in both authoritarian and consensual systems comes from either economic crises or incremental 
changes that reduce the effectiveness of the coercive enforcement of rules or norms of cooperation 
and, therefore, induce organizations to attempt to implement radical institutional change (North, 
2005).  
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While the basic conceptual elements of North’s previous work remain central to the Access 
Order theory of development, the main claim to theoretical innovation comes from the role 
given to violence in explaining social order and the path of economic transformation. North 
et al. (2009: xi) go so far as to claim that the inclusion of violence within their framework 
achieves the elusive goal of integrating political and economic theory into a united analytical 
model of development. Social theories that explore the links between violence and 
development abound, but North et al. explicitly position themselves as different from other 
contemporary approaches to the political economy of violence. Charles Tilly (1992), 
Geoffrey Parker (1996) and Robert Bates (2001) all argue, in various different ways, that 
military competition drove the emergence and consolidation of the power of the state. North 
et al. argue that these approaches are flawed as they start from the assumption that the state is 
a single actor with an existing monopoly over violence. Tilly’s work, for example, focuses on 
how the capacity for violence of different states shaped societies and how relations between 
military and business were forged. Besley and Persson (2007) build on Tilly’s argument to 
show how investment in collective public goods linked to war helped to consolidate state 
building.  
 
In contrast, the Access Order theories start from the assumption that the capacity for violence 
is dispersed across different organizations in society rather than being held by a unified state 
entity. In the Access Order theories the state is treated as a coalition of organizations defined 
as the ‘dominant coalition’, as it reflects the ability of particular groups of elites to coordinate 
with each other in the distribution of rents while excluding other, less powerful elites. This 
frames the study of violence and development around how a particular dominant coalition 
sustains itself, rather than examining the impact of war on the capacities of the state. In the 
Open Access Order, the state does hold a monopoly on the use of violence but this is because 
elites have voluntarily decided to give up their capacities for violence to the state. The war 
and development theses place the experience of war, the deals forged between military and 
business groups and the material demands of war-making as central to explaining different 
trajectories of economic transformation. The Access Order theories, however, continue with 
North’s long-term focus on the way that organizations and institutions affect the internal 
dynamics of collective action between groups who now need to find solutions to maximize 
their returns in the face of the inherent violence of other collective action groups.  
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Previously, the understanding of human motivations within new institutional economics was 
based on the idea that individuals are driven to maximize self-interest — although 
perceptions of self-interest would be shaped by (unexplained) ideological commitments. In 
the new model, however, violence becomes central to the framework employed by North et 
al. because humans do not simply seek to maximize their material position but also are 
genetically programmed to act in violent ways. Their framing of violence as a universal 
human characteristic with implications for various social phenomena has echoes of Hobbes 
(1651/2008) and North et al. (2009) emphasize this intellectual lineage by using the term the 
‘natural state’ to refer to Limited Access Orders. The idea that social order and a universal 
human propensity for violence are inextricably linked is also prevalent in popular 
evolutionary psychology. For example, Steven Pinker (2011) argues in a similar way to North 
et al. that Western societies constrain human beings’ natural inclination for violence. The 
simplistic agonistic notion of human nature in these approaches leaves no room for exploring 
the inherent tensions that exist within humans between our ability to be violent and our 
ability for nurture, protection and cooperation that are equally natural and important in 
shaping social institutions.
8
  
 
In terms of the relationship between North’s previous work and the Access Order approach, 
the inclusion of violence as an overarching constraint on group behaviour modifies the logic 
of collective action in important ways. The concept of violence is of importance to 
understanding development within the Open Access framework primarily because of its 
impact on the material interests of elites and its effects on the calculation of relative prices 
attached to different courses of action. The decision by elites to be violent depends on 
calculations as to whether the returns from their violent acts, in terms of their ability to 
control rents, outweigh the benefits of peaceful production in the absence of violence. The 
control of violence in any social order is important, according to this approach, because it 
creates uncertainty and destroys production; hence, there is a negative trade-off between the 
level of violence and the rate of economic development.  
 
Economic gains from violence do not result from the fact that violence itself can be a strategy 
of accumulation, as argued by Cramer (2006). Instead the economic benefits of violence 
                                                          
8
 Hobbes is often wrongly characterized as arguing that our social orientation is unnatural. While he 
argued that humans exhibit egoism, they also strive to create the conditions for social harmony 
(Amato, 2002). 
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relate to the redistributive impact on the distribution of rents. Similar to the role of ideology 
in North’s earlier work, violence becomes a form of transaction cost within a model of 
society as a market in which individuals bargain over courses of action to maximize profits. 
Violence acts as a fundamental constraint on optimization but unfettered optimization 
remains the correct counterfactual against which to assess human behaviour. North et al. 
argue that once violence has been reduced through the incentive mechanisms of the Open 
Access Order, individuals are able to benefit from the unconstrained pursuit of individual 
optimization.  
 
Given that the claims to theoretical innovation hinge on the importance given to the concept 
of violence within their framework, a striking feature of the Access Order approach is how 
little insight we gain from the theory into the experience of violence in developing countries 
or across history. Indeed, description and analysis of war and violent conflicts are notably 
absent from Violence and Social Orders (North et al., 2009). Violent political upheavals such 
as the French revolution, colonial conquests and the great wars of the twentieth century play 
no part in the account of the transition between social orders or in their understanding of 
contemporary development. The authors argue that such violent events are unimportant in 
explaining social order as they often fail to lead to a fundamental change in the distribution of 
power between elites and do not change the underlying logic of competition within the order. 
They explain that this is because the latent capacities for violence affect politics just as much 
as actual violence. In developing countries, group violence is frequently latent but it still 
shapes the way that the dominant elite distributes rents and controls the economy. This raises 
obvious problems in terms of gauging levels of violence occurring in developing countries.  
 
The fact that North et al. treat the threat of organized violence and actual violence as 
synonymous means that their framework is of little use in terms of exploring the phenomenon 
of violence itself. Their main focus is on the importance of collective violence, but within 
that category the theory is blind to the distinction between forms of collective violence such 
as ritualistic violence, group hostility, broken negotiations or opportunistic brawls (Tilly, 
2003). The theory is silent on the consequences of violence for people’s lived experiences. 
Further, a proper examination of the motivations behind collective violence is precluded by 
the assumption that the type of collective violence that is important for explaining social 
phenomena emerges from the accumulation strategies of elites. The relationship between elite 
accumulation strategies and violence is mediated through patron–client networks that North 
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et al. argue are the basis of politics in Limited Access Orders. Non-elites have little direct 
political agency in this model except as a rent-a-mob for elites. Interestingly, however, they 
argue that violence operates both within and across patron–client networks, moving away 
from the assumption that such networks are maintained by material interest alone. They argue 
that elites call on other elites to maintain discipline of non-elite groups as well as to suppress 
the emergence of other organizations that may threaten their control over rents. This opens 
the theory to a much more explicit engagement with the role of power in the dynamic 
relationships between elites and non-elites — something that was absent from North’s earlier 
work. But the idea also privileges reduction in some forms of violence over other forms as 
using violence to control non-elites can be justified on the basis of needing to achieve 
stability between elites.  
 
Ultimately, collective violence occurs when the distribution of rents is out of line with the 
violence capacity of different elite groups. This misalignment of the distribution of rents 
between elites can occur for a number of reasons that are endogenous to their model, such as 
economic performance, changes in the nature of rents and changes in the membership or 
balance of power within the dominant coalition, as well as the nature of public policy. 
However, North et al. explicitly exclude the international political and economic system from 
their analysis. The processes of change that the model does not seek to explain include 
changing relative prices, climatic events and technological change. More importantly, 
perhaps, the threats of violence from neighbours and the impact of geopolitical struggles 
remain outside their explanatory framework. Violence within OECD countries and the role of 
war-making by the rich countries of the world hardly feature in their analysis, as violence is 
assumed to play a minimal role within the politics of the Open Access Order. This means that 
the linkages and interplay between the apparent non-violent politics that generally 
characterizes Open Access Orders and the violent politics of Limited Access Orders are 
ignored. The fundamental weakness in their conception of violence stems from their 
inadequate engagement with the role of violence as an instrument of power. On questions 
such as the historically rooted and variable relationship between violence and power, as well 
as the geopolitical context of war and violence in developing countries, the Access Order 
theory is worryingly silent.  
 
North et al. argue that the most pressing issue in contemporary development is not how 
developing countries can transition to become Open Access Orders but how to reduce 
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violence within the logic of the Limited Access Order. This implies a very different idea 
about the meaning of development from North’s earlier implicit association of development 
as a process of introducing and solidifying liberal political and economic institutions, in 
particular through liberalizing markets. In contrast, embedded within the Access Order 
theories is a conceptualization of development as a process of reducing violence. This chimes 
with the broader shift over the past decade towards a framing of development by international 
development institutions around issues of security (Hettne, 2010; Kaplan, 1994). The 
implications for development policy of this shift in the definition of development are 
important. The types of institutions that promote economic efficiency and growth may be 
very different from the types of institutions that promote security in developing countries, as 
recognized by North et al. However, the institutions that constrain violence may also be very 
different from the institutions that best promote other aspects of human well-being, or indeed 
human freedom. A broader conception of development is necessary to examine the 
relationship between economic change, political order and human well-being. The Access 
Order theory does not provide this.  
 
 
THE PERFECT MARKET PRESERVED? 
 
While the Access Order theory is an approach to development that appears to privilege 
economics by emphasizing the transactional nature of politics in developing countries, the 
model is surprisingly silent about the economic sphere itself; production, distribution, 
accumulation and economic growth are left largely unexplained within the framework. The 
reason for this lies in the continued dependence on a set of neoclassical economic 
assumptions about economic processes. Establishing the boundaries of a neoclassical 
approach is complicated by the fact that the field and practice of neoclassical economics has 
expanded and mutated over time since North’s earliest work. North’s institutional economics 
has reflected and has also, arguably, influenced the path of intellectual developments within 
mainstream economics over the past fifty years. Mainstream economics has moved away 
from some of the very restrictive assumptions around equilibrium, rationality, perfect 
information and marginal pricing towards a focus on complexity, experimentation and 
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multiple equilibria.
9
 Nevertheless, the Access Orders continue to be attached to a set of 
neoclassical assumptions about methodological individualism, methodological optimization 
(albeit subject to the constraint of violence) and the primacy of liberalized markets for 
promoting economic growth.  
 
Despite these aspects of continuity, the Access Order theories also reflect a shift in the 
understanding of the potential role of rents in economic development that is emerging 
amongst mainstream policy makers and academics. In classical political economy a rent was 
defined as the return to the ownership of an asset rather than to productive activity, but in 
modern economics rents are defined as a return generated by political intervention to restrict 
the free market. North et al. explicitly reject the understanding of rents associated with 
Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982) who argue that rents are unproductive and lead to a 
deadweight loss to the economy. Instead North et al. adopt a looser definition of rent as a 
return to an asset or action higher than the return to the next best opportunity that has been 
foregone. In North’s previous models, individuals were motivated to maximize rents but rent 
creation and attendant rent-seeking had a negative impact on economic performance (North, 
1990). However, in Violence and Social Orders North et al. (2009) explicitly reject this 
assumption. They recognize a variety of positive economic purposes of rent creation, from 
Schumpeterian rents to promote innovation, to the role of rents in overcoming market failure 
(Schumpeter, 1961; Stiglitz, 1989).  
 
The potential positive role for rents that are generated by state interventions in markets has 
become much more widely accepted within development policy in recent years as the market 
fundamentalism of economic development policy under structural adjustment has given way 
to a broader acceptance of the potential role of the state in fostering economic development. 
This change reflects research into the experience of East Asian countries that achieved rapid 
rates of economic growth with significant support from the state in the form of technology 
and industrial policies (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). The current economic consensus has 
therefore shifted towards an understanding that the state can play a positive role in economic 
development not only through the provision of stable market institutions but also through 
specific interventions to create rents and modify market prices (Lin, 2012). The most 
important modification in the economic assumptions of the Access Order theories compared 
                                                          
9
 For a summary of the debate around defining neoclassical economics see Colander (2000); Lawson 
(2013). 
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to earlier New Institutional models is in the understanding of the implication of rents for 
economic development. The primary function of rent creation within Limited Access Orders 
is to constrain violence. Individuals within the Access Order framework are still assumed to 
be driven by the basic desire to maximize rents; however, North et al. argue that the dynamics 
of rent allocation within the dominant coalition is crucial for controlling violence. Rent 
creation therefore gains a functionality that was absent in previous New Institutional 
Economics models. This has important implications for the policy advice that comes out of 
this framework: international development policy advice should move away from the ‘good 
governance’ recommendations on reducing rents and rent seeking, and should focus instead 
on finding the best way to distribute rents to reduce violence. In a break from previous New 
Institutional Economics models, North et al. recognize that rent creation can have a positive 
function within economic development, although this is only the case within Open Access 
Orders. 
 
While opening the possibility for growth-enhancing rent creation by states, North et al. 
maintain that economies of Open Access systems are more dynamic because of low and time-
bound rent creation while rents created by states in developing countries tend to be driven by 
redistributive demands that hamper economic development. The actual examples of 
productive and unproductive rent creation that they use to illustrate the different economic 
implications of rents in Open and Limited Access Orders, however, suggest a conventional 
set of recommendations about economic and social policies in developing countries. For 
example, they argue that the free trade policies implemented under NAFTA helped to 
improve economic growth while trade union lobbying for increased wages led to 
unproductive rents that diminished economic growth. Hence the idea that moving to more 
competitive markets facilitates economic growth remains core to their underlying economic 
model. Further, they distinguish between social policies that create negative rents that involve 
‘direct transfers, such as those to government employees, teachers, and guarantees to labour’ 
compared to social policies in Open Access Orders which do not involve direct transfers but 
are in the form of ‘public good provision that generates positive economic returns’ (North et 
al., 2009: 143).  
 
Rents have very different implications and functions in Open Access Orders. North et al. 
argue that while rents exist in Open Access Orders, they are not distorted by the need to 
mitigate the potential for organized violence of powerful groups. Their explanation for the 
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dynamism of the economy in Open Access Orders comes from the higher level of 
competition that is generated by open access to create organizations and low transaction costs 
where unproductive rents are minimized. The Open Access Order is characterized as an 
idealized system of competition where economic power has little influence over political 
decisions. The redistributive aspects of rent creation within Open Access Orders, such as 
protection of intellectual property rights or the protection given to companies through limited 
liability legislation, remain unexplored. While power has a role in explaining the creation and 
distribution of rents within the Limited Access Order, the role of economic power of 
multinational companies and of monopolies is not considered to be an important factor within 
the political and economic decision making of Open Access systems. North et al. (2009: 269) 
argue that in Limited Access Orders ‘all big economic organizations are necessarily also 
political ones’. In contrast, ‘big economic organizations typically concentrate far more on 
markets and are only tangentially involved in politics’ (ibid.) in Open Access Orders.  
 
This assumption means that the processes through which multinationals and powerful firms at 
a national level consolidate economic and political power within industrialized countries and 
use this influence to affect rent creation in developing countries through international trade 
and investment policies falls outside their explanatory framework. Thus, while recognizing 
the potential importance and implications of the concentration of economic power for the 
functioning of markets in Limited Access Orders, economic power is assumed to be 
unimportant for explaining economic outcomes in the Open Access Order due to open 
competition. In fact, the economic model of the Open Access system assumes an idealized 
form of competition between economic organizations that mimics the perfect market 
counterfactual of neoclassical economics. Thus, the conceptual device of the Open Access 
Order allows a number of key features of the underlying neoclassical economic model to be 
preserved. The implication of this for development policy is to maintain the basic hierarchy 
of institutional forms that was at the heart of the good governance agenda, while 
simultaneously avoiding the exploration of the interconnections between the politics and 
economics of developed and developing countries.   
 
 
ACCESS ORDERS AND CAPITALIST TRANSITION  
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On one level, the model of societal evolution within this framework appears to be the 
antithesis of the Marxist approach to explaining historical change as a process of transition 
between distinct modes of production driven by the contradictions that arise within the sphere 
of production. The concept of capitalism is notably absent from the Access Order framework. 
Nevertheless, in other respects there are ‘intriguing echoes of Marx’, as the back cover of 
Violence and Social Orders states (North et al., 2009). This is perhaps not surprising as North 
was a self-proclaimed Marxist before his conversion to neoclassical economics (Klein and 
Daza, 2013). As with the Access Order theories, Marxist theory places conflict as central to 
explaining historical change. The nature of these conflicts, however, is determined by the 
social structure of production. This means that Marx does not restrict his analysis to class 
conflict alone but also discusses the historical role of intra-elite conflict, particularly among 
the emerging bourgeoisie (Marx, 1978). The role of horizontal conflicts within a Marxist 
framework is taken further by Robert Brenner, whose work is praised by North (North, 
1986). For Brenner the transition to capitalism depended on the emergence of a free labour 
force which created the conditions for productivity increasing competition between 
capitalists. However, Brenner argues that this process was the unintended consequence of 
conflict over property rights that occurred between producers themselves rather than between 
vertical classes (Brenner, 1985).  
 
Another recent approach to development that is also inspired, in part, by Brenner’s analysis 
of the original transition to capitalism in Europe, can be found in Khan’s work on political 
settlements and development (Khan, 1995, 2004, 2010). Khan’s political settlement approach 
pre-dates the Access Order theories and North et al. (2009: xvi) acknowledge the influence of 
his ideas on the development of their analytical framework. Khan writes that ‘[a] political 
settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also 
sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’ (Khan, 2010: 4). Similarly to the 
Access Order theories, Khan argues that the distribution of power across a broad range of 
developing countries lies significantly out of alignment with their formal institutions. The 
consequence of this is that powerful groups operate through informal routes, primarily 
through patron–client networks, to protect their political power and rights over income flows, 
including state-generated rents. Where the distribution of these income flows is not in 
alignment with the underlying distribution of power, the stable clientelist political settlement 
will break down as powerful groups increasingly exercise their power through collective 
violence. Both theories, therefore, place patron–client networks and the distribution of rents 
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as central to explaining political stability in developing countries. This generates the common 
conclusion that good governance reforms to institutions may directly hinder processes of 
political stabilization and constrain rather than promote economic development. 
 
While their insights into the determinants of political stability in developing countries are 
similar, other key aspects of their frameworks, namely, the drivers of transition and the 
underlying social and economic model in which they are based, are different in important 
ways. The conceptual framework of the political settlements theory draws from historical 
materialism while the Open Access concepts are rooted in neoclassical economics and 
Weberian sociology. For example, the Access Order theories use Weber’s concept of the 
power of personal charisma of leaders to explain the logic of patron–client politics in 
developing countries. In contrast, the political settlements approach explains the dominance 
of neo-patrimonial forms of political power as the result of economic structure. Thus, in 
countries with a small capitalist sector few profits are generated and states in developing 
countries lack sufficient resources to cover the high costs of maintaining effective formal 
institutions. The consequence of this is that powerful groups operate through informal routes 
to protect and generate income flows and to sustain their power, drawing on a range of 
socioeconomic factors including ideas, traditional hierarchies, force, institutions and the 
historical experience of organizing politically. 
 
The Access Order theories see the rise of impersonal relations as the key to explaining the 
effectiveness of formal institutions in OECD countries. In contrast, Khan (2010) explains the 
stability of these countries as a result of the capitalist structure of the economy. Thus, the 
capitalist political settlement involves a distribution of power that is dominated by the high 
levels of profits generated by capitalists. Formal institutions, the most important of which are 
the protection of private capitalist property rights, are broadly aligned with and sustained by 
the social, economic and political power that capitalists have, based on capitalist profits. 
Although there may be significant forms of struggle between competing groups, 
redistribution occurs mainly through formal institutions. There is a reinforcing relationship 
between the generation of profits from formal capitalist property rights and the availability of 
resources to sustain those rights. Formal institutions and rights dominate in that they underpin 
nearly all output and incomes and the distribution of power is therefore determined by the 
incomes generated by these formal institutions.  
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The drivers of transition in the political settlements approach are also significantly different 
from the doorstep conditions of the Access Order outlined above. This is because Khan’s 
economic model draws from a conception of capitalism that is absent from the Limited 
Access framework. For Khan, the drivers of development depend not only on the ways that 
political stability is attained but also relate to particular features of economic growth in the 
contemporary capitalist world. Technology acquisition becomes central to explaining the 
relative pace and direction of economic transition in the context of a global economic order in 
which the scale and complexity of the industrial production process necessitate a period of 
learning and catch-up. Further, economic development in Khan’s model requires the 
accumulation of capital and in developing countries this often occurs through processes of 
primitive accumulation, defined as the process of accumulation outside the formal market 
process where political power is used to privilege the accumulation activities of particular 
individuals. In contrast, the underlying economic model used in the Access Order theory 
remains tied to an essentially neoclassical model where economic development occurs 
through the gradual accumulation of factors of production primarily through formal market 
processes. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Open Access theories are an influential and important new approach to examining 
contemporary processes of development. By examining the underlying reasons why 
institutions have very different implications for economic development in developed 
compared to developing countries, the Access Order theories serve to challenge many of the 
previous assumptions about institutions that were embedded within the dominant good 
governance agenda. In an intellectual career that spans over half a century, North has 
consistently argued that to enhance economic performance, countries should adopt low 
transaction cost institutions, organizations and belief systems that he identifies as the Western 
liberal political and economic model. In this sense, the Access Order theories do present an 
important break from North’s previous commitments to a particular path of institutional 
reform in developing countries.  
 
The expanding engagement with a range of social phenomena, most importantly violence and 
conflict, pushes new institutionalism further away from many of the basic assumptions of the 
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neoclassical model. The theories, therefore, present an opportunity for expanding debate 
within both policy and academic circles on the role of institutions and economic 
development. In terms of North’s own intellectual journey, these theories represent a 
continued move away from some of the most restrictive aspects of his neoclassical roots. Yet 
the framework is remarkably silent on the sphere of the economy itself. This is because North 
et al. remain committed to an essentially a-historical conceptual framework in which 
individual maximization through market-like transactions is assumed to be the main 
explanation for economic processes and human motivation. In this way, Access Order 
theories serve to re-articulate important underlying aspects of the neoclassical model. Indeed, 
through the conceptual device of the Open Access Order, the theory is able to re-assert the 
primacy of the neoclassical market model. Despite framing development around the concept 
of violence, the theory has very little to say about violence itself. Violence is reduced to a 
form of transaction cost that limits individual optimization strategies. These conceptual 
weaknesses mean that Access Order theories cannot adequately address the variety of, and 
difference between, societies. It is worth being cautious of the analytical value of a 
framework that explicitly places Tanzania in the 1970s in the same analytical category as 
Nazi Germany (see North et al., 2013b; 14).  
 
The emergence and appeal of the Access Order theory of development reflects the broader 
shift within the framing of development from a concern with the integration of countries 
within the process of economic globalization towards a narrative that is concerned with 
controlling violence in developing countries. North’s earlier preoccupation with efficiency 
and economic growth as the important outcomes of development is replaced by an implicit 
definition of development as the control of violence. Development, therefore, becomes 
synonymous with security, with little consideration given to the socioeconomic implications 
of achieving this. Policy interventions and institutional reform in developing countries that 
promote elite stability may be incompatible with other and, arguably, equally important 
aspects of development. Indeed, the Access Order approach could justify support for 
repressive and anti-democratic elites on the assumption that such support is necessary to 
achieve long-term developmental outcomes. The theory therefore serves to strip the 
progressive and transformatory potential out of development by ignoring accumulation and 
income distribution, by limiting politics to elite self-interest, by neglecting non-elite struggles 
and by remaining silent on how controlling violence may affect human capabilities, rights 
and freedom. 
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